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THE SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN CRIMINAL CODES AND
THE COMMON LAW
Stanley Yeo"
ABSTRACT
This article identifies the advantages which flow from judicialexamination
of the inter-relationshipbetween criminal code provisions and common
law pronouncements on criminal law. It outlines when judges interpreting
and applying code provisions may be permitted to refer to common law
pronouncements, andwhen common law judges might benefit from a study of
code provisions.Australian, Canadianand Indiancases are used to illustrate
the propositions that can be obtainedfrom these courses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is not concerned with whether the criminal law should be
codified or should remain in the hands of common law judges. Rather, it seeks to
highlight the propositions tat can be derived by studying certain jurisdictions
whose criminal laws have been influenced by both criminal codes and the
common law. Such a convergence of these two forms of criminal law is bound to
produce interesting outcomes. This is because the judges in these jurisdictions
could approach the law in any one of at least two ways. They could insist on
confining their pronouncements entirely within the particular form (whether code
or common law) that the law of their jurisdiction takes; or they could study both
forms of the criminal law and seek, as far as possible, to adopt the best or worst of
what both codes and the common law have to offer. The first of these approaches
is conventional and, while entirely proper, misses out on the opportunity to reach
the best available solution to a legal problem by comparing the ways by which
a code and the common law resolve the matter. The second approach involves a
comparative study of code provisions and common law decisions, and it is here
that propositions may be drawn from past cases to ensure that, in future, only the
best and not the worst features of the two forms of criminal law are embraced.
What then are the best and worst features of criminal codes and common
law developed criminal law?' Broadly stated, the major strength of a code lies
in its potential to lay down a schematic, comprehensive and readily understood
set of laws. Its major weakness lies in the fact that a code cannot hope to provide
answers to each and every problem that may arise in the future. In contrast, the less
prescriptive and gradually evolving nature of the common law places it in a better
position than a code to resolve these emerging problems. However, this common
law strength is also a weakness as common law judges are apt to take a piecemeal
approach to resolving problems, rather than the systematic and comprehensive
approach which codes attempt to provide?
Australia, Canada and India lend themselves particularly well to this study
since they possess the required mixture of codes and common law. Additionally,
their criminal laws originate from basically the same source, namely, 191h century
English law, thereby allowing for broad inter-jurisdictional comparisons to be
1

2

See T. Letoumeau and L. Cohen, Codification and Law Reform: Some Lessons from the
Canadian E.erience, 10 STATUTE LAw REviEW 183 (1989); M. Goode, Codification of the
Australian Criminal Law, 16 CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL 5 (1992); R. Cross, The Making of
English Criminal Law(S): Macaulay, CRIMINAL LAW REvIEw 519 (1978); A. Ashworth,
InterpretingCriminal Statutes, 107 LAw QUARTERLY REVIEW 419 (1991).
See A.T.H. Smith, Judicial Lawmaking in the Criminal Law, 100 LAw QUARTERLY REvIEW
46(1984).
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made. Australia comprises several criminal jurisdictions with some having their
own criminal codes and others being common law based. Canada is governed by
a single criminal code4 but a residual clause5 contained in the code, together with
the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms,6 have produced a common law system
alongside the code. As for India, its criminal law is contained in a single code but
some of the code provisions have been judicially interpreted in ways which more
closely reflect the English common law than the precise wording of the code7
In this article, I will suggest that the following propositions should be applied
in the interaction between codes and the common law:*

where the wording of a code provision is clear, judges should adhere closely
to the meaning of those words and assume that the provision exhaustively
pronounces the law on the Matter. Judges may obtain a better understanding
of the law by examining the similarities and/or differences between the
common law and the code provision;

*

where the wording of a code provision is unclear in some respect, judges
should look first to other closely associated provisions in the code for
guidance, followed by identical or otherwise similar provisions of other codes
and, only then, have recourse to the common law for support or elucidation;

3

The Code jurisdictions are the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Western
Australia, while the common law jurisdictions are New South Wales, South Australia
and Victoria. The Northern Territory code was formulated in 1983, the Queensland
and Western Australian codes were drafted by Samuel Griffith in the late 19h century
and the Tasmanian code was derived from James Stephen's draft code as amended by
the English Royal Commission of 1879, viz. Report of the Royal Commission to consider
the Law Relating to Indictable Offences, British Sessional Papers, House of Commons,
1878-1879.
The Canadian code, like its Tasmanian counterpart, was based on James Stephen's
draft code as amended by the English Royal Commission of 1879: Supra note 3.
Namely, §8(3) which is discussed below. The residual clause provides for the

4
5

6
7

continuation of common law defences which are not otherwise provided for in the
Code. Until its abolition in 1954, a residual clause continued in force all common law
offences not specifically dealt with in the Code.
The Charter was added to the Canadian Constitution in 1982. Under §52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, laws passed by Parliament can be struck down by the courts
should they be found to violate one of the rights in the Charter.
The Indian code was primarily the work of Thomas Macaulay in the first half of the 19h
century. A likely explanation for the judicial adherence to English common law was
that many judges were English trained at least until the time of Indian independence.
This judicial tendency to invoke the English law has been attributed by one Indian
commentator to "the inexplicable desire to bring Indian law in line with English Law": see
R. Kelkar, Provocationas a Defence in the Indian Penal Code, 5 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW
INSTITUTE 319, 338 (193).
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*

judges of common lawjurisdictions should, wherever possible, take a holistic
approach when making pronouncements on the criminal law. In this regard,
studying a code could prove most instructive;

*

judges of common law jurisdictions should endeavour to state the law in
simple and readily comprehensible terms. Referring to code formulations
may help achieve these highly desirable objectives.

I shall now present each proposition in turn and use judicial decisions from
Australia, Canada and India to illustrate the advantages accruing from them, and
the negative consequences of not following them.

IL JUDGES SHOULD CLOSELY FOLLOW THE CLEAR WORDING
OF A CODE PROVISION
Since codes are generally intended to be clear, exhaustive and comprehensive
pronouncements of the law, judges should always give the wording contained in
a code its plain meaning, without any recourse to the previous law. Otherwise,
all the benefits gained by codification will be dissipated. This seems an all too
obvious proposition which has been the subject of pointed declarations by judges
of the highest courts in the three jurisdictions under consideration. 8 For instance
in Brennan v. The King, the High Court of Australia issued the following warning
in respect of interpreting a particular provision in the Criminal Code of Western
Australia:[The provision] forms part of a code intended to replace the common
law, and its language should be construed according to its natural
meaning and without any presumption that it was intended to do no
more than restate the existing law. It is not the proper course to begin
by finding how the law stood before the Code, and then to see if the
Code will bear an interpretation which will leave the law unaltered.9
The need for such a declaration indicates that there have been occasions
when judges have gone astray. One reason for doing so might be the perception
held by some judges that the code was merely a restatement of the then existing
8

9

For an Australian example, see Rv. Barlow, (1997) 93 ACrim R 113,136-137 per Kirby J.;
for a Canadian example, see Victoria (City) v.Bishop of Vancouver Island, [192112 AC
384,387 per Lord Atkinson [Privy Council]; and for an Indian case, see Gokul Mandar
v. Pudmanund Singh, (1902) 4 Born LR 793, 796 per Lord Davey [Privy Council].
Brennan v.The King, (1936) 55 CLR 253, 263 [High Court of Australia] per Dixon and
Evatt JJ.
[Hereinafter, "Brennan"], citing Bank of England v.Vagliano Bros, (1891] AC
107, 144-145 per Lord Herschell [House of Lords]. See, R v. Barlow, (1997) 93 A Crim
K 113,125 [High Court of Australia] per McHugh J,and at 136 per Kirby 1.
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common law such that it was permissible to draw upon that law, Another reason
might be the familiarity and/or affinity which some judges, by their training or
experience, may have had with the common law. Whatever the explanation, judges
when interpreting a code provision should confine themselves to the plain and
natural meaning of the wording of the provision. Only when such a meaning has
been declared might they usefully refer to the meaning given by the common
law. Where the meaning is the same under the code provision and the common
law, such a comparative exercise will simply confirm that common law and code
provisions are often the same. Where there is a difference, this could serve to bring
out more clearly the explanation for the Code framer's particular choice of words,
and from there to discover the reason for deviating from the common law at the
time of codification.
The Australian case of Jervis v. R contains a good example of this proposition
being followed."' The accused, who was party to a plan to obtain blood from the
victim, had supplied her knife to a co-accused who used it to kill the victim. The coaccused was convicted of murder and the accused was convicted of manslaughter.
On appeal against her conviction to the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal,
the accused argued that Section 7 of the Criminal Code of Queensland extended
criminal responsibility to an accomplice only as regards the offence committed
by the actual perpetrator and not some other offence. The approach taken by de
Jersey J. in that court is instructive. He began by invoking the basic principle of
statutory construction that words in a code should, as far as possible, be given their
natural meaning." Applying this principle to the section under consideration, de
Jersey J. observed that the obvious purpose of Section 7 was to render liable for
the offence committed not only the actual perpetrator, but also those who aided,
counseled or procured the perpetrator to commit that offence. Therefore, the natural
construction of the term "the offence" appearing throughout the section refers to
the offence which had been committed by the perpetrator, and not some other
offence. 12 His Honour acknowledged that this view went against certain common
law authorities which had been followed by a majority of the Tasmanian Court of
Criminal Appeal in R v. Murray.13 De Jersey J. thought that the majority in Murray
10
11
12

13

Jervis v. R, (1991)56 A Crim R 374 [Court of Criminal Appeal, Australia]. [Hereinafter,
"Jervis"]
Citing the passage in Brennan reproduced earlier in the main text accompanying
footnote 9.
Jervis, 400-401. Admittedly, his Honour was in dissent, the majority preferring to give
a technical interpretation to "the offence" appearing in §7 as the crime of "unlawful
killing" which could comprise both murder and manslaughter.
R v. Murray [1962] Tas SR 170,176 [Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal] per Burbury
CJ. and agreed to by Gibson J. [Hereinafter, "Murray"l
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was unduly influenced by the common law on the issue, at the expense of giving
effect to the plain language of the section.1 4 In conclusion, he said that should
legislature regard the application of the plain wording of Section 7 as producing
a socially undesirable result, the solution would be amendment so as to bring the
code into line with the common law position.'5
There is another possible ground supporting de Jersey's decision in Jervis
to interpret Section 7 of the Queensland code as confining accessorial criminal
responsibility to the offence committed by the perpetrator. It is that a distinction
may be drawn between plain words and doctrines when considering the effect, if
any, of the common law on a code provision. According to Toohey J. in the High
Court of Australia case of R v. Falconer, "[cllearly, it is permissible to look to [common
law] decisions to throw light on the terminology of the Code.""t However, "[t~here is no
roomfor common law doctrines unless they are incorporatedin the Code itself."1t Applying

this distinction to Jervis, the court was there concerned with the doctrinal issue of
the scope of accessorial criminal responsibility under the code. Since the wording
of the operative section clearly expressed that doctrine quite differently from the
common law equivalent, it was not permissible to incorporate the common law
into the code.
The Supreme Court of Canada case of Jobidon v. The Queen is an example of
judicial departure from the plain meaning of a code provision.'8 The appellant had
been convicted of unlawful act manslaughter for killing the deceased in a fist fight
which both men had consented to engage in. The Crown based the "unlawful act"
component of the charge on physical assault which, according to Section 265(1)
(a) of the Criminal Code, occurs when, "without the consent of another person,[the
accused] appliesforce intentionally to that other person". A majority of the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction. Gonthier J., who delivered the judgment for the
majority, reached this conclusion after deciding to follow the English common
law ruling in Attorney-General'sReference (No 6 of 1980)19 that public policy "vitiates
consent between adults who intentionally apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial
14
15
16
17
18

Murray,404, and preferring the dissenting judgment of Crawford J in Murray (at 195)
who disavowed recourse to the corresponding common law principles.
Supra note 14.
Rv.Falconer, (1990) 171 CLR 30,65 [High Court of Australia]. [Hereinafter, "Falconer"]
Falconer,67.
Jobidon v.The Queen, (1991) 66CCC (3d)454 [Supreme Court of Canada]. [Hereinafter,
"Jobidon"]For an Indian example, see the case of Sabal Singh v. State, AIR 1978 SC 1538
[Supreme Court of India] which defined "goodfaith" in terms of recklessness in spite
of the existence of a code definition of that term, namely, §52 which reads: "Nothing
is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and
attention."

19

Attorney-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980), [1981) 2All ER 1057 [Court of Appeal].
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bodily harm to each other in the course of afistfight or brawl". 20 With respect, this flies
directly in the face of the plain wording of Section 265(1)(a) which specifies that
an assault occurs only if intentional force was applied "without the consent of' the
victim or complainant. As Sopinka J. observed in his dissenting judgment: "The
effect of[Gonthier J.'s] approachis to create an offence where one does not exist under the
The offence created is the intentional
terms of the Code by applicationof the common law.
2
'
victim."
the
of
consent
the
with
force
applicationof
In Sopinka J.'s view, since Canadian criminal law was codified, it was
untenable for judges to ignore the plain wording of the code provision by a robust
application of judge-made policy. It is submitted that this is the correct view. The
majority in Jobidon should have kept closely to the plain wording of the provision in
question. Having done so, it might have usefully engaged in an in-depth discussion
of the issue by contrasting the code position with the English common law. The
majority might then have gone on to suggest reasons why the Code framers
regarded an individual's right to consent to a fight as prevailing over the interest
of avoiding breaches of the peace. In this regard, the majority might have referred
to some of the Australian code provisions which have taken a similar position and
considered judicial interpretations of those provisions.?2 Had the court in Jobidon
undertaken such an inquiry, its judgment would have provided Canadian judges
in subsequent cases with a much better appreciation of the theoretical and practical
workings of the issue of consent in the law of assault.
In India, there is a line of case authorities which have read a requirement of
reasonable retaliation into the provision on provocation in the IndianPenal Code. The
Privy Council decision in Attorney-General (Ceylon) v. Pererais, perhaps, the most
notable of the cases which have done so.? This has been done despite the fact that
the code provision on provocation says nothing whatsoever about the requirement.
The requirement is derived from the English common law and stipulates that
20
21
22

23

Jobidon, 494.
Jobidon, 460.
See, §246 of the Criminal Code of Queensland as interpreted in R v. Raabe, [1985] Qd R
115, 125-126 per Derrington J. [Western Australia Court of Criminal Appeal]. See also
Carroll v. Lergesner, [1991]lQd R 206 [Western Australia Court of Criminal Apeall
and the discussion of that case by G. Syrota in Consensual Fist Fights and other rawls:
Are they a Crime?, 26 UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA LAW REVIEW 169 (1996).
Attorney-General (Ceylon) v. Perera, [1953] AC 200 [Privy Council]. The Privy Council
was interpreting the provision on provocation contained in the Penal Code of Ceylon
(now Sri Lanka) which is identical to the provision in the Indian Penal Code. For other
cases, see State v. Sarwan Singh, (1954) Cr LJ 1505 [Supreme Court of India]; State v.
Dattu Genu Gaikwad, (1974) Cri LJ 446 [Supreme Court of India] and most recently
Arun Ra i v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal No. 1123 of 2008 (13th May, 2010), available
at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx [Supreme Court of India].
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"the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation ifthe
offence is to be reduced to manslaughter",' In contrast, there is the Allahabad High
Court case of Akhtarv. State where Beg J. commenced his judgment by noting the
complete absence of any such requirement in the wording of the code provision
on provocation.? He then proceeded to provide an explanation, based on legal
history, as to why the English common law imposed such a requirement but not
the Code. 6 Basically, it was that the requirement was a "hand over" of the times
when self-defence and provocation were confused in English law. When the Indian
code was drafted, this confusion had been removed with the result that the plea
of provocation was treated under the Code as separate and distinct from the plea
of self-defence. Beg J.also opined that the requirement of reasonable retaliation
was contrary to the nature of the plea of provocation since, "once [an accused's]
power of self-control has been lost, it would beftiile to expect him to retain such a degree
of control over himself'? 7 The correctness of this observation was recently affirmed
when the English Law Commission on codification used it to explain the absence
of the requirement under its proposed provision on provocation. 8 Thus, Akhtar
represents a model of sound and cautious judicial regard for the plain wording of
a code provision and the benefits of undertaking a comparison, contrasting as it
might turn out to be, with the common law position.

III. JUDGES SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTIOUS INNOVATION
WHERE A CODE PROVISION IS LACKING IN SOME RESPECT
At first reading, this statement seems inconsistent with the primary aim
of codification which is to comprehensively and exhaustively pronounce the
criminal law. Yet, no matter how thorough the author of a code might be, history
has shown that there will be bound to be ambiguities in the wording of code
provisions, entire gaps which need to be filled for justice to be done, and practical
difficulties in applying the provisions. 9 These weaknesses in a code may be the
24
25
26
27

28
29

Mancini v. DPP, [1942] AC 1 [House of Lords].
Akhtar v. State, AIR 1964 All 262 [Allahabad High Court] [Hereinafter, "Akhtar"] and
approved in Krishnan Nair v.State, (1965) Kerala LT 50 [Kerala High Court].
Supra note 25 at 266.
Supra note 25 at 266.
The English Law Commission, No 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Vol. 2
(London: HMSO), cl 58 of its draft Criminal Code, (1989).
Thus, prompting the High Court of Australia to say in Boughey v. The Queen, (1986)

161 CLR 10, 21 [High Court of Australia] that "[hlistory would indicate that the codifier
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result of oversight, poor drafting, or because societal values and expectations have
altered with the passage of time. Whatever the reason, judges encountering them
will be required to clarify or rectify the defective law. In doing so, there is a strong
tendency for judges to look to the common law for instruction. While this may be
entirely permissible, judges should be careful to ensure that their pronouncements
are entirely in keeping with the rest of the code. To achieve this, they should first
determine whether associated words and other provisions in the code shed light on
the ma tter. Moving further afield, judges should examine judicial pronouncements
on identical or else closely similar provisions contained in another code. Only
when they have completed their examination of these code-based sources should
judges consider what the common law has to say. Any similarities drawn from the
common law will then serve to confirm the judge's finding on the matter whilst any
differences could usefully serve as a catalyst for the judge to discover the conflicting
principles underpinning the code and the common law. 0 Such an enquiry would
be bound to greatly increase judicial understanding of the intended nature and
operation of the particular code provision in question.
It would be helpful to discuss the cases illustrating this proposition under
the following sub-headings: (i) where a code does not define a term; (ii) where an
essential requirement is absent from a code provision; (iii) where a code provision
is incomprehensible or impractical of application; and (iv) the benefits of including
a residual code provision.
A. Where a Code does not Define a Term
The Australian case of Falconer is a good example of the proper resolution
of such a problem.3' The accused had pleaded non-insane automatism to a charge
of wilful murder under Section 278 of the Criminal Code of Western Australia.
will never achieve the clarity and completeness which would obviate any need for subsequent

interpretationand commentary".

30

For a detailed discussion of the application of this proposition to selected areas of
Canadian criminal law, see M.A. Staer, Self-Defence and Consent: The Use of Common
Law Developments in Canadian CriminalCodeAnalysis, 32 ALBERTA

31

LAW REVIEW

484(1994).

See Falconer. For another good Australian example, see the High Court decision in
Boughley v. The Queen, (1986) 161 CLR 10 [High Court of Australia]. For a Canadian
example, seeR iv.Ruzic, (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 1 [Supreme Court of Canada], interpreting
the immediacy and presence requirements of the duress provision in the Canadian
Criminal Code. For an Indian example, see the Supreme Court of India decision in
Manney Khan v. State, AIR 1971 SC 1491 [Supreme Court of India] discussing the

meaning of "good faith" appearing in the Indian Penal Code provisions on self-defence.
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Consequently, it became necessary for the High Court to interpret Section 23 of the
code which provides that "a person is not criminally responsiblefor an act or omission
which occurs independently of the exercise of his will". The court noted that the word
'will' was not defined by the code and capable of several meanings.? Ultimately,
it held that the word "imports a consciousness in the actor of the nature of the act
and a choice to do an act of that nature".? It drew support for this definition from
previous High Court pronouncements on the notion of 'will' in other Australian
code jurisdictions? Additionally, the court referred to certain common law
pronouncements on the notion of will, and justified doing so by observing that
Samuel Griffith, the framer of the Code, had not been conscious of any divergence
between Section 23 and the common law. Even then, the court felt it necessary to say
that:- "[or course, that is not conclusive of the meaning of any particularprovision in the
Codes, but it isan indication that the problem which arises now in astatutory context may
be answered in away which answers the correspondingproblems under the common law."5
After conducting a detailed comparison between various pronouncements on
the code provision and at common law, the court concluded that the requirement
of a willed act substantially corresponded with the common law requirement that
an offender's act be done 'voluntarily'.
The above stages of judicial deliberation in Falconerare succinctly described
in the following comment by Kirby J in the subsequent High Court of Australia
case of R v. Barlow:
At least in matters of basic principle, where there is an ambiguity
and where alternative constructions of a code appear arguable, this
Court has said that it will ordinarily favour the meaning which
achieves consistency in the interpretation of like language in the
codes of other Australian jurisdictions. It will also tend to favour
the interpretation which achieves consistency as between such
jurisdictions and the expression of general principle in the common
law obtaining elsewhere? 6
32
33
34
35
36

Falconer,39 per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ.
Supra note 32.
Valiance v.The Queen, (1961) 108 CLR 56, 64 [High Court of Australia], Timbu Koran
v. The Queen, (1968) 119 CLR 47,81 [High Court of Australia].
Falconer,37 per Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ.
R v. Barlow, (1997) 93 A Crim. R 113, 137 [High Court of Australia]. This may be
contrasted with a case where a doctrine or principle embodied in a code is clear, as
illustrated by the earlier discussion of Jervis accompanying footnotes 16 and 17 above.
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The reason KirbyJ. gave for advocating this line of interpretative construction
was the desirability of achieving, wherever possible, uniformity in basic principles
of criminal law throughout Australia."
Another example of a sound judicial approach to interpreting undefined
terms in a code is Stingel v. The Queen, a decision of the High Court of Australia
hearing an appeal from Tasmania against a murder conviction 8 The appellant
had relied on the defence of provocation contained in Section 160 of the Criminal
Code of Tasmania which states in part that the provocation must have been "of
such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinaryperson of self-control". Since the
provision did not elaborate on the concept of the ordinary person, it was necessary
for the High Court to search other sources of law for clarification. The court relied
heavily on the judgment of Wilson J. in the Supreme Court of Canada case of R
v. Hill which had a lengthy exposition on the ordinary person test under Section
232 of the Criminal Code of Canada." The court in Stingel did so after noting that
the Tasmanian and Canadian codes were the work of the same author, namely,
James Fitzjames Stephen, and the wording of the provisions on provocation in both
codes was almost identical. The court was well aware that "in this particularfieldof
criminal law, the common law, the Codes.. .andjudicialdecisions about them have tended
3 Yet, the court thought
to interactand to reflect a degree of unity of underlying notions".Y
it preferable to keep its focus firmly fixed upon the code provision. Only after it
had relied on the code-based decision in Hill to draw up a detailed description
of the ordinary person, did the court turn to certain common law authorities to
41
further support its pronouncements.
37
38

39
40
41

Supra note 36.
Stingel v. The Queen, (1990) 171 CLR 312 [High Court of Australia]. [Hereinafter,
"Stingei"l See also the High Court of Australia caseof R v.Callahan, (1952) 87 CLR 115
[High Court of Australia] which held that the same degree of negligence was required
to establish manslaughter under §266 of the Western Australian code as was required
at cormon law.
R v. Hill, (1986) 25 CCC (3d) 322 [Supreme Court of Canada].[Hereinafter, "Hill"]
Stingel. 320. Cf. the point accompanying footnote 37 above concerning the desirability
of producing uniform basic principles of the criminal law among the various Australian
jurisdictions.
Stingel,328-329,331, citing such Australian common law authorities on provocation as
Moffa v. The Queen, (1977) 138 CLR 601, R v. Webb, (1977) 16 SASR 309 and Romano
v. R, (1984) 36 SASR 283. The Indian code provision on provocation does not expressly
specify an ordinary person test, but this has not prevented the Indian courts from
reading it into the provision: see the Supreme Court of India decision in Nanavati v.
State, AIR 1962 SC 605, 630 [Supreme Court of India].
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B. Where an essential requirement is absent from a code provision
The general provision on self-defence under Section 34(1) of the Criminal
Code of Canada is a good example of this.The provision states that self-defence is
available to "everyone who is unlawfully assaultedwithout having provoked the assault".
Although the wording of Section 34(1) seems to require an actual occasion of
unlawful assault, this would be an unwarranted limitation on the scope of the
defence, leading to unjust results. Three kinds of threat occasions are possible
for the purpose of self-defence. These are: (i) an actual occasion, (ii) an honestly
albeit unreasonably believed occasion and (iii) a reasonably believed one. The first
exists as a matter of objectively demonstrable fact. The second, like the third, is
the product of the accused's mind and is accordingly not concerned with whether
a threat occasion did actually exist or not. It especially presents itself in cases
where the accused has mistakenly believed in the existence of a threat occasion or
mistakenly assessed the seriousness of such an occasion. The difference between
the second and third kinds of occasions is that the second involves an entirely
subjective perception by the accused that he or she is being threatened while the
third is limited by an objective test of reasonableness. Restricting the defence to
actual assaults would cause it to be denied to a person who, in highly pressured
circumstances, took defensive action against someone whom the person mistakenly
believed to be attacking her or him. Fortunately, the Canadian courts have read
a requirement of reasonable belief into Section 34(1). For instance, in R v. Baxter,
the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the "doctrine of mistake of fact is applicable
to §34(0)" so that "[aln accused's belief that he was in imminent dangerfrom an attack
may be reasonable,although he may be mistaken in his belief'. 2 The court reached this
ruling by linking Section 34(1) with Section 34(2) and noting that the latter provision
specifies that the defendant must have used force "under reasonableapprehensionof
death orgrievous bodily harmfrom the violence" of the assailant.4 Only when the court
had completed its examination of the relevant code provisions did it proceed to
cite common law authorities which supported its ruling.frAs an aside, the court in
Baxter could also have referred to the provisions on self-defence in the CriminalCode
of Tasmania which, as noted earlier, shares the same origins as the Canadian code.
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Rv.Baxter, (1975) 27 CCC (2d.) 96,111 [Ontario Court of Appeal] [Hereinafter, "Baxter"]
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Had it done so, the court would have found that the Tasmanian provisions likewise
subscribe to a requirement of reasonable belief concerning the threat occasion.4
An example from India is the absence of any specific defence provision
covering cases of non-insane automatism such as occurred in the previously
discussed Australian case of Falconer." The simple explanation for this absence is
that the defence is a recent one which was never in the contemplation of the 1 9t"
century English jurists concerned with criminal law." Had the defence then been
present under English common law, it is probable that Macaulay, the principal
author of the Code, would have expressly provided for it. Be that as it may, the
question remains as to the proper approach to be taken by Indian judges in a
case such as Falconer.Since there do not appear to be any Indian decisions on the
issue, I would suggest the following approach which seeks to obtain a solution
within the structure of the Code. It is that Indian judges should regard a plea of
non-insane automatism as relating to the actus reus of an offence rather than as
affecting the mens rea." Under this view, the voluntariness of the accused's conduct
should be regarded as an essential constituent of the criminal act, which is part
of the actus reus. This being the case, once an accused suggests that he or she may
have acted automatically, the prosecution is left to discharge the ultimate burden.
When non-insane automatism is treated in this manner, it raises the contention
that the prosecution has not proved its case. It may then be argued that the Code
was meant to be exhaustive only in respect of defences which negate the mens rea
of an offence. Accordingly, submissions that the prosecution has not proved the
actusreus of an offence (such as when non-insane automatism is pleaded) have not
been ruled out by the Code. Only when possible solutions from the Code itself, such
as the one suggested, have all been canvassed should Indian judges be permitted
to turn their attention to the common law authorities on the matter. In doing so,
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they would find that the common law likewise recognises a plea of non-insane
automatism which has the effect of negating the actus reus of the crime charged.4 9
C. Where a code provision is imcomprehensible or impractical of application
Some code provisions may be so poorly drafted as to become internally
inconsistent, unduly complex or confusing. In such an event, it may be untenable
to comply with the standard rules of statutory interpretation calling for strict
compliance with the wording of the code and the examination of related provisions
for elucidation. The provisions on self-defence contained in the Criminal Code of
Canada provide a good example of such an unhappy situation. For the purposes
of this discussion, it will not be necessary to go into the difficulties created by
these provisions." Suffice to say that for many years, Canadian judges had striven
to interpret the four provisions on self-defence as covering separate spheres of
application. Thus, Section 34(1) was read as covering cases where the accused
did not provoke the assault and, in response to the threat, had not intended to
cause death or grievous bodily harm; Section 34(2) dealt with cases where the
accused had intended to cause death or grievous bodily harm; §35 applied where
the accused was the initial aggressor; and Section 37 was concerned with cases
where the accused had used force to prevent an unprovoked assault against herself
or himself or anyone under the accused's protection. However, this approach
frequently led to insurmountable difficulties of comprehensibility and judicial
application. Eventually, it led Lamer CJC of the Supreme Court of Canada to make
the following comment in R v. McIntosh:"Certainly, interpreting statutory provisions in context is a reasonable
approach. However, a 'contextual approach' lends no support to the
Crown's position. First, the contextual approach takes as its startingpoint the intention of the legislature. However, given the confused
nature of the Criminal Code provisions related to self-defence, I
cannot imagine how one could determine what Parliament's intention
was in enacting the provisions. Therefore, it seems to me that in this
case one is prevented from embarking on a contextual analysis ab
initio."51
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In McIntosh, the Crown had submitted that a court taking a contextual
approach would read into Section 34(2) the words "without having provoked the
assault" so as to bring it into line with Section 34(1). The Crown argued that
this would avoid the "absurdity" of both Section 34(2) and Section 35 applying
to initial aggressors. In rejecting this submission, Lamer CJC.said that the clear
words of Section 34(2) did not preclude it from applying to persons who had
been initial aggressors and so the provision should be given that effect. Given the
gross inadequacies of the code provisions on self-defence, the stance taken by the
learned Chief Justice is entirely supportable, although he was keenly aware that his
ruling only slightly improved the law under the Code; hence his call for legislative
clarification of the self-defence regime under the Code.
D. The benefits of including a residual code provision
The preceding discussion has shown that criminal codes can never be perfect
in every way so as to provide a ready answer to each and every problem that
comes before the courts. It might therefore be prudent for code framers to include
a residual clause which retains the common law but in very limited circumstances.
One such limitation is to deny judges the power to create new offences on the
ground that such a power should be entirely within the domain of the legislature
and also because it would otherwise be unfair to accused persons. 53 This leaves the
matter of common law defences. In keeping with the spirit of codification, judges
should be required to ensure that any common law defence they are minded to
recognise should not in any way run counter to the provisions of the code. Stephen
felt the need for just such a restrictive type of residual clause with the result that
one is prescribed in the criminal codes of Canada and Tasmania. Section 8 of both
codes provides that:"Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any
circumstance a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a
charge continues in force and applies in respect of proceedings for
an offence under this Act or any other Act of Parliament except in
so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or any
other Act of Parliament."
It is due to this clause that the Canadian courts have maintained that the
common law defences of duress, necessity, due diligence, intoxication, mistake of
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McIntosh, 180.
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fact and entrapment exist alongside the CodeM Earlier on, I had considered the
absence of any provision for the plea of non-insane automatism under the Indian
Penal Code.- A residual clause like the one in the Canadian and Tasmanian codes
would have greatly assisted the Indian judges to recognise such a common law
defence. In fairness to Macaulay he was, like Stephen, well aware that his code could
never be a perfect and exhaustive pronouncement of the criminal law. However,
rather than having a residual clause which recognised common law defences,
Macaulay proposed a different measure.6 It was that whenever an appellate court
reversed a lower court on a point of law not previously determined or whenever
two judges of a higher court disagreed on the interpretation of a provision of the
Code, the matter should be referred forthwith to Parliament, which should decide
on the point and, if necessary, amend the Code. I shall have more to say about this
attractive proposal later on.
IV. COMMON LAW JUDGES SHOULD TAKE A HouSTIC
APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW
In this and the next proposition, I consider what judges in common law
jurisdictions can gain by studying a criminal code when seeking to resolve a
legal problem. Judges at common law are apt to restrict their pronouncements to
the particular facts of a case although, occasionally, they might declare a general
principle on which a specific pronouncement is based. The doctrine of precedent
and the resulting cautiously incremental approach towards legal development
are the hallmarks of the common law. While these may be admirable features of
the common law, they also create a tendency in judges to unduly restrict both the
scope of their deliberations and the effect of their pronouncements. In contrast,
the process of codification promotes a holistic development of the law, with the
Code framer striving to ensure an internal consistency among all the provisions of
the code. To accomplish this, code framers rely much more frequently on general
principles to determine specific pronouncements than do the judges at common
law. It follows that these judges could benefit greatly from a study of the way a

54

55
56

See the Supreme Court of Canada cases of R v. Ruzic, (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 1 [Supreme
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code deals with a particular issue. Some examples will now be given to illustrate
this proposition.
In the common law jurisdictions of Australia and England, the fault (or
mental) elements for the crimes of murder and involuntary manslaughter have
been developed in a poor fashion. These fault elements cannot be defined with
maximum certainty nor can they be fairly applied to offenders unless judges
invoke a schematic approach when defining these elements. "7 Such an approach
is advanced by taking a holistic view of the criminal law rather than limiting one's
inquiry to the narrow confines of the particular issue in question. The scheme to
be applied requires judges to first decide on what other types of fault elements,
besides the paradigm fault element of an intention to kill, are deserving of the
murder label. Only when this decision is made should they proceed to determine
what constitutes the appropriate fault elements for involuntary manslaughter.
Justice and elementary logic dictate that the fault elements for manslaughter
should fall one rung in degree of moral culpability below the fault elements
prescribed for murder. This scheme has not generally been applied at common law
by Australian and English judges. They have instead dealt with the fault elements
for the two offences as quite distinct entities with the result that the definitions of
fault elements for murder and manslaughter are often uncertain and the degree
of moral culpability is pitched at too low a level to warrant conviction for these
very serious offences. The same criticism cannot be leveled against the framers
of the Indian Penal Code. By fully embracing the schematic approach, they have
achieved maximum certainty in the definitions of the fault elements for the crimes
of murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (the Code's equivalent
of manslaughter) and demanded an appropriately high level of moral culpability
for those offences. Australian and English judges would therefore have greatly
benefited from an examination of the Indian code provisions (or those of other
codes for that matter) when deciding on the fault elements required for murder
and manslaughter at common law.
The judges of Australian common law jurisdictions have occasionally drawn
upon Australian criminal codes for elucidation. Besides their desire, wherever
possible, to devise unified laws for the code and common law jurisdictions of
Australia, these judges have been attracted to the codes for their holistic rendition
of the criminal law. One instance of this is the minority judgment of Wilson J in
the High Court of Australia case of R v. O'Connor." The issue there was whether
57
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or not the Australian common law should depart from the English common law
rule on self-induced intoxication as pronounced in DPP v. Majewski.Y1 Among the
reasons given by Wilson Jfor retaining the rule was the fact that the Queensland,
Tasmanian and Western Australian codes subscribed to it, as did the Indian Penal
Code and the American Law Institute Model Penal Code." Another instance of the
reliance placed on a code occurred in the High Court of Australia case of Wilson
v. The Queen where the issue was whether or not there is a common law crime
of battery manslaughter. In their joint majority judgment, Mason CJ.,Toohey,
Gaudron and McHugh JJ.arrived at their decision against recognising such an
offence on the ground that none of the Australian criminal codes prescribed it.92
Likewise, when deciding to expunge the plea of excessive self-defence from the
common law,' 3 the High Court of Australia in Zecevic v. DPPgave as a reason the
fact that the plea was unavailable in the Australian criminal codes. 6 Certainly,
merely because the codes have taken a certain position should not automatically
mean that it is sound law. However, a common law judges deliberations over which
course to take will be greatly enhanced by an examination of the code position.
Should a judge have made a decision which turns out to be consistent with the
code, the decision is that much stronger for it. Where the judge's decision runs
counter to the code position, he or she will feel obliged to explain the reasons for
taking a different path. Such an explanation will invariably add to the thinking
on the matter. There is absolutely no reason why such a useful practice should be
confined to Australian judges alone - surely, their counterparts in other common
law jurisdictions would benefit from the same exercise.

V. COMMON LAW JUDGES SHOULD STRIVE
FOR SIMPLICITY AND COMPREHENSIBILITY

To have the criminal law simply stated, easily understood and readily
accessible to members of the public constitute primary objectives of the codifier.
The Indian Penal Code appears to have so successfully achieved these objectives
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that, James Fitzjames Stephen, after a visit to India, was led to observe that "pocket
editions of [the Code] are published,which may be carriedabout as easily as a pocket Bible;
and I doubt whether, even in Scotland, you uouldfind many people who know their Bibles
as Indian civilians know their [Code]."6 ' While the common law does not facilitate
the bringing together of the criminal law in this manner, judges at common law
should aspire towards simplicity and comprehensibility when expounding and
declaring the law.
As an illustration of this proposition, reference may be made to the Australian
common law plea of self-defence. For many years, the plea was governed by a set of
six propositions formulated by Mason J in the High Court of Australia case of Viro
v. The Queen." In several subsequent cases, it was revealed that these propositions
were hampering rather than assisting jurors in comprehending the law.67 Doubts
were also expressed whether the propositions were confined in their operation to
homicide cases alone since Viro involved an appeal against a murder conviction.
It took a decade for the High Court to rectify these problems. That transpired in
Zecevic where Mason J's set of propositions was reduced to the following"The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused
believed upon reasonablegrounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do
what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonablegroundsfor it, or
if the jury is left in reasonabledoubt about the matter, then he is entitled to
an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application
and is not limited to cases of homicide." "8
It is noteworthy that the court felt the need, as part of its exercise at
simplification, to pronounce the law in terms which made it generally applicable to

all cases. The High Court in Zecevic could have made its task at simplification easier
by drawing ideas from code provisions on self-defence. Had it done so, the court
would have found the Australian codes unhelpful since the self-defence provisions
contained in those codes are as obscure and complex as their counterparts in
Canada." In their stead, the court could have relied on the self-defence provisions
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under the Indian Penal Code, the salient portions of which state that:-2
Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of private defence.P
Every person has a right to defend his own body, and the body of any other
person, against any offence affecting the human body.!
The right of private defence in no case extends to the infliction of more harm
than is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.!
The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit
the offence, though the offence may not have been committed; and continues
as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.7
These code provisions are clear and succinct in their coverage of matters
which have troubled judges in common law jurisdictions worldwide, They include
the type of threat occasion, the degree of force permitted to be used in defence,
the nature of the accused's belief, and the permissibility of pre-emptive strikes in
self-defence.

VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The formulation of the criminal law has never been an easy task, not least
because it directly concerns principles of fundamental justice affecting the
life, liberty and security of persons. Judges have a critical role in devising and
developing criminal law rules which reflect these principles and this is so whether
those rules are contained in a code or in case authorities. The preceding evaluation
of selected decisions and practices of courts in code and common law jurisdictions
has shown that judges from both criminal law systems have much to learn from one
another. In respect of codified criminal law rules, while judges should follow closely
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the clear meaning of a statutory provision, their understanding of the provision
could be greatly enhanced by a comparison with the equivalent common law
rule. Where the meaning of a provision is uncertain, judges should seek answers
from other comparable code sources before considering the common law position.
With regard to judges of common law jurisdictions, they have much to gain by
examining code provisions for their holistic approach and for their simplicity and
comprehensibility.
The preceding discussion has also shown that the criminal law is never static
but moves in response to changing community values, expectations and current
notions of moral blameworthiness and justice. This is so for both code and common
law jurisdictions. As may be expected, experience has shown that code jurisdictions
have a much harder time than common law jurisdictions in accommodating these
changes. A residual provision recognising common law defences has helped
code jurisdictions such as Canada and Tasmania to tackle this task. However, the
downside of this measure is that it creates a separate common law jurisprudence
alongside a code, thereby diminishing the benefits of simplicity, exhaustiveness
and comprehensibility which are the positive attributes of codification. Another
measure commonly found in code jurisdictions is a procedure enabling Attorneys'
General to refer points of law to the courts for clarification.h Yet another measure
comprises adverse judicial rulings which have prompted legislative amendment of
perceived defects in a code. 6 While these measures have occasionally been relied
upon to clarify or alter the codified law, they are at best piecemeal in nature. This
is because their success depends entirely on the defect coming before a court,
followed by the initiative of Attorneys' General or judges to have the defect ratified.
A preferred measure would be the one proposed by Macaulay of legislatively
mandating that ambiguous or not previously determined points of law that are
unearthed by the courts should be referred forthwith to Parliament which should, if
necessary, amend the code." To assist Parliament, a distinguished body of criminal
law experts could be established to provide advice on the best solutions to the
problems identified by the courts. In line with the general thrust of this article,
such a body should be made to examine the way other code jurisdictions, as well
as common law jurisdictions, have resolved the problem. For this measure to work,
it would be necessary to legislatively prescribe a certain time frame within which
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Parliament must rectify the ambiguous or unanswered issue in the code. Without
such a provision, there is every likelihood that political inertia will cause the whole
exercise to fall by the wayside.7
Reverting my attention to judges, on one view, the various propositions
presented in this article are not novel since they are concerned with well worn
principles of statutory interpretation, the reliance on precedent, and standard
techniques of lawmaking by common law judges. Yet, the fact that there are and
continue to be occasions when judges have ignored these propositions, shows
that judges need to be constantly reminded of them. On another view, however,
the propositions presented here go beyond the usual ones because they promote
an inter-change of ideas between code and common law jurisdictions. Of the
jurisdictions studied, the High Court of Australia seems the most willing to engage
in this exercise of discovering the symbiotic relationship between a code and the
common law. The likely explanation for this is the court's desire, wherever possible,
to unify the laws of the various code and common law jurisdictions under its charge.
However, even without such an impetus, the huge benefits to be gained from such
a comparative exercise make it imperative for judges of other jurisdictions to follow
suit. The following comment by Professors Zweigert and Kotz is directed at those
judges who are reluctant to take this course:"When judges of a superior court are faced with a difficult problem
of principle it is surely wrong for them to disregard solutions and
arguments which have been proposed or adopted elsewhere just
because they happen to emanate from foreign courts and writers
[including the authors of codes] ... Taking comparative arguments

into account certainly means more work for the judge, but nowadays,
thanks to researches of comparatists, there are many areas in which
foreign material is much more accessible;..,"79
The small but steadily growing literature on comparative criminal law
comprising judicial decisions, reports of law reform bodies, books and articles (like
this one) and, of course, computer-generated data bases of foreign legal materials,
amply validates the closing remark of this comment.
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